Understanding the development of the ESDP : Perspectives and insights from historical institutionalism and theories of learning by Reynolds, Christopher
INSTITUT UNIVERSITARI D’ESTUDIS EUROPEUS 
Obs 
Observatori de Política Exterior Europea 
 
Working Paper n. 64 
June 2005 
 
 
Understanding the development of 
the ESDP: Perspectives and insights 
from historical institutionalism and 
theories of learning 
 
 
 
 
Christopher Reynolds 
Pre-Doctoral Researcher in Political Science at the Technische 
Universität München 
 
 
 
How can we best understand the emergence of the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)? This paper applies the 
theories of historical institutionalism and experiential learning to 
offer a dynamic conceptualisation of moves towards an ESDP 
which highlights some of the causal factors that a more 
temporally-restricted analysis would miss. It firstly shows how 
the institutional and functional expansion of European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) over the course of the 1970s and 80s gave 
rise to a context in which the development of a security and 
defence dimension came to be viewed as more logical and 
even necessary. It then goes on to analyse some of the 
external factors (in the form of actors, events and institutions) 
that further pushed in this direction and proved to influence the 
policy’s subsequent evolution. The paper is therefore intended 
to act as a first-step to understanding the ESDP’s development 
from this perspective. 
 
 
 
Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona 
Edifici E-1 
08193 Bellaterra  
Barcelona  (España) 
 
 
© Institut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus. Todos derechos reservados al IUEE. All rights reserved. 
Working Paper 63 
Observatori de Política Exterior Europea 
 
 2
INTRODUCTION 1  
 
How can we best understand the emergence of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)? 
What processes led member states to move beyond the conception of the European Union (EU) as 
purely a “soft” or “civilian” power and instead pursue a foreign and security policy reinforced for the 
first time in its history with military capabilities? This paper rejects a narrow focus on the relatively 
rapidly unfolding events of 1998-99 that ostensibly led to the institutionalisation of the ESDP in favour 
of a more historical approach. It argues that by process-tracing back to the inception of foreign policy 
coordination within the EU in the Luxembourg Report of 1970 we can illustrate the evolution and 
consolidation of the idea of a security and defence dimension to the project of European integration, 
as well as the contribution and impact that geopolitical events had on this eventuality. In so doing it 
illustrates how while not strictly inevitable, a number of historical processes and events lead us to the 
conclusion that ESDP was essentially the logical outcome of the conjuncture of a number of different 
causal sequences. These causal sequences are explained through the application of theories of both 
historical institutionalism and learning. The paper shows how a loosely institutionalised system of 
foreign policy coordination and cooperation that began in the 1970s came to evolve into a 
sophisticated and highly institutionalised foreign policy system in which the creation of a security and 
defence policy in the late 1990s came to be considered as possible, logical and even necessary. It 
equally highlights the geopolitical events that acted as catalysts for moves towards an ESDP and 
which provided much of the incentives for policy makers to seek to improve the efficiency and widen 
the competence of the system that they had created through a process of “learning” that was to 
manifest itself through attempts at institutional change. The paper is therefore intended to act as a 
first-step towards understanding the ESDP’s development from this perspective. I begin by briefly 
outlining the theories employed, and then go on to offer a historical perspective on foreign and security 
policy cooperation in the EU with these approaches in mind.  
 
 
I. THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
 
1. Historical Institutionalism 
 
It has become something of a platitude to assert that institutions “matter” in the study of political 
science, so much so in fact that there is now little “new” about so-called “New Institutionalism” (Hall 
and Taylor 1996, Peters 1999). However, of particular relevance to the present research is the strand 
of institutionalist theory known as Historical Institutionalism, which is to say an approach that 
emphasises that both institutions and history can be said to “matter” (Steinmo and Thelen 1992, 
Pierson and Skocpol 2002, Pierson 2004). History matters because many social processes are 
considered to be incremental, hence an explanation of causal outcomes requires an understanding of 
their development over time. This points to the importance of introducing a degree of process-tracing 
to our analysis. History also matters, so Historical Institutionalists assert, because policy-making and 
institution building are considered to be cumulative or “path dependent” in nature, in that positive 
feedback mechanisms “lock-in” previous decisions and influence and restrict subsequent ones 
(Pierson and Skocpol 2002, 7-8). Such “residue” may be unintended by policy makers or institutional 
designers given the high degree of complexity and uncertainty in institutional design and decision-
making more generally, and hence the existence of unintended consequences is taken as given.  
 
And yet while the question of institutional and political path dependency in European foreign and 
security policy represents a paper in itself, here the objective is to account for processes of policy and 
institutional change. How and why do institutions, defined by March and Olsen (1998) as “relatively 
stable collection[s] of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in 
specific situations”, actually change? While certainly Historical Institutionalism speaks more of 
institutional stability, it does not deny that change occurs. It does, however, suggest that fundamental 
change can be difficult to effectuate because of path dependent processes and that consequently 
change will often be incremental and occur at the institutional margins rather than the core. Moreover, 
larger scale change is considered more likely to occur as the result of something that Historical 
Institutionalism conceptualises as “critical junctures”.  
                                                 
1 Research for this paper was financed by the European Commission’s Human Potential Programme (Contract 
number HPRN-CT-2002-00233) 
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Such “critical junctures” can be understood as the conjuncture or interaction of different events or 
developments (whether international, domestic or both) in a way that creates a pressure for political or 
institutional change. Historical Institutionalism emphasises that precisely because many causal 
processes in politics are slow moving, it will generally take a long time for a “critical mass” of different 
factors to develop in favour of change, or else the conjuncture of events of sizable significance. Such 
an amount of pressure is required because of the strength of positive feedback pressures outlined 
above. Once this “tipping point” is reached, the costs associated with change are considered to be 
reduced, and the ability of policy entrepreneurs to act as “triggers” is greatly increased (Pierson, 
2004). Therefore although change will not invariably occur, the potential for it to occur is increased. 
Pierson (2004) uses the analogy of an earthquake, where the event itself happens quickly but the 
necessary pressure has taken years to build up.  
 
While this approach points to “when” change will occur, other theories point to “how” such change will 
occur. Different strands of Historical Institutionalism incorporate different interpretations of change, but 
here I want to take more of what can be termed a “cultural” approach (Hall and Taylor 1996, 8). This 
suggests that actors define their preferences endogenously, rather than exogenously, to institutional 
interaction and therefore accepts that institutional preferences are not fixed (Thelen 1999). 
Accordingly I focus on the theory of learning and its application to understanding and explaining the 
creation and subsequent institutional development of the ESDP. 
 
 
2. Learning 
 
In a sense, learning is a difficult concept to pin-down. This is not least because, as so often in political 
science, it is essentially a contested theory. It is difficult to be clear on what exactly we are looking at 
when even terminologies vary: Hall (1993), for example, refers to “social learning”, while Levy (1994) 
focuses on “experiential learning”. There is no agreement on who learns, why they learn, how they 
learn, nor on the consequences of such learning. Thus if the concept is to be any use to us then some 
clarification is certainly in order. As a starting point we might follow Bennett and Howlett’s (1992:276) 
general observation that all learning theories essentially take as their starting point the fact that: 
“states can learn from their experiences and that they can modify their present actions on the basis of 
their interpretation of how previous actions have fared in the past”. However, we must acknowledge 
that not all learning will result in an actual “modification” in action, simply because there may be 
institutional or other constraints to such change, particularly in a multi-level governance structure such 
as the EU. Therefore we might more fruitfully employ Levy’s (1994:283) definition of (experiential) 
learning as “a change in beliefs (or the degree in confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of 
new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience.” 
Learning is therefore understood as a two-stage process in which first the observation and 
interpretation of experience leads to a change in individual beliefs, and secondly this change in beliefs 
is considered to influence subsequent behaviour (Levy, 1994:291). This of course leaves of a host of 
unanswered questions in its wake. 
 
We might begin by asking where learning takes place.  Firstly, it is important to be clear that learning 
takes place within the individual. Hence when we speak of “governmental” or “organisational” learning, 
for example, we refer to the process that learning at the individual level becomes aggregated and 
translated into wider governmental or organisational action.  By implication, learning may take place 
among political actors at different political levels. Given the complexity of EU governance structures 
and the number of actors and institutions implicated, this makes learning within a multi-level system all 
the more complicated and intriguing. The potential therefore exists for “top-down” learning, which is to 
say among governmental elites who act as entrepreneurs to mobilise a coalition for change, but also 
“bottom-up” learning in which bureaucrats or political and / or technical experts may attempt to “sell” 
their ideas or beliefs to political leaders (Levy, 1994: 301-1). Within the EU, such experts might also 
include supranational institutions, such as the Commission. Conditions for their success may include 
the power of their ideas, their access to those at leadership levels, their political skill, as well as the 
degree of congruence between their ideas and those in decision-making positions (Levy, 1994:301).  
 
However, if one focus is on a change in beliefs then we might point out that learning can take place at 
different cognitive levels in the sense that core beliefs might be less subject to learning and 
subsequent change than lower-level beliefs (Tetlock 1991, Sabatier 1993, Hall 1993). Applied to an 
institutional setting, this implies that actors’ cognitive ordering of institutional rules and procedures 
according to importance might render change among those rules that correspond to their core beliefs 
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less likely than among those ordered lower down the hierarchy. That is not to say that change in core 
beliefs is impossible, but rather that it is more likely to occur as the result of a significant catalyst, such 
as a “critical juncture”, or over an extended period of time. More generally, the above logic also implies 
that those actors with more entrenched beliefs are less likely to “learn” than those less committed to 
their beliefs (Levy, 1994:302).  
 
We must also ask why and how experience might cause political actors to change their beliefs and 
how this change itself translates into subsequent (institutional) change.  If we accept that actors will 
seek institutional change when they consider the potential benefits of alternative arrangements to 
outweigh the costs implicit in existing structures and the process of their reform (Cortell and Peterson, 
2002:8), then in most cases some external catalyst or “environmental trigger” is required to question 
the existing equilibrium and precipitate actors to re-evaluate such costs and benefits. Of particular 
importance therefore, particularly in a structure of foreign policy cooperation, are geopolitical events. 
Where institutional structures are considered to have been inefficient in enabling actors to achieve 
their desired response to a particular event, then the actor’s experience of this event may cause them 
to question the existing system and to consequently seek to effectuate change. Thus it is the event 
itself that has led the actor to change their beliefs or preferences regarding the existing institutional 
structure and attempt to develop new procedures as a result. Within EU foreign policy, we might point 
to the Union’s experience in dealing with the Balkan crises of the 1990s and how this translated into 
institutional change in the Amsterdam Treaty (see below).  This however raises the question of where 
actors might draw these ideas or models for new procedures from. Given scarce resources as well as 
the impossibility of knowing the consequences of untried or tested procedures, actors may seek 
examples of institutional “best practice” for these new procedures and subsequently to transfer 
institutional models perceived as more efficient from another time or place. This can be termed “policy 
transfer” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Evans and Davies, 1999).  
 
Exactly how such learning is translated into change (or not) clearly depends upon the political system 
under analysis. But if we examine the EU, and the CFSP more specifically, the challenge of 
aggregating learning in a system with 25 member states, each with a potential veto over change, is 
clear. Given that different actors at different levels within each member state might learn in different 
ways, and that even if this is aggregated into a governmental position this position then has to be 
reconciled with those of the other 24 states, we might hypothesise that we are more likely to see 
stability in CFSP structures, if only because of the “joint-decision trap” (Scharpf, 1988). Clearly change 
does occur, and perhaps surprisingly frequently, therefore how member states come to formulate 
reform proposals (the Commission had initially no right of initiative and today has only a shared right of 
initiative in CFSP) and then translate these proposals into agreed institutional change is of particular 
interest.  
 
 
II. INSTITUTIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL 
COOPERATION (EPC) 
 
The next section of this paper examines both the evolution and institutional and functional expansion 
of European foreign policy cooperation with these previous theoretical points in mind. Firstly, it 
attempts to highlight the importance of institutions in this process, both in terms of internal processes 
but also with regards to external institutions. We must continually bear in mind that EPC was entering 
a pre-existing institutionalised environment and therefore had to be reconciled with existing 
institutions, most particularly NATO. Indeed, that there would be an automatic division of labour 
between the two organisations (the EU as a “soft power” on the one hand, with NATO a “hard” military 
power on the other) was virtually taken for granted and was one reason for the “stickiness” of the EU 
as a “civilian power”. Given the strategic imperatives of the Cold War, institutional change within EPC 
would have to compatible with its position vis-à-vis NATO, and certainly the United States has long 
been the “ghost at the table” (Sloan, 2000) at all discussions in this policy field. Secondly this paper 
aims to show how we might begin to employ theories of learning to explain the institutional change 
that, it is argued, was a necessary pre-requisite to the pursuit of the option of the EU as a security and 
defence actor, and which in itself also helped to create a momentum towards such an eventuality. 
Thirdly, it attempts to track the evolution of the idea of an ESDP. Although the idea of a European 
defence independent of the United States is actually long-standing and stems back at least to 
proposals for a European Defence Community (EDC) in the early 1950s (Fursdon, 1980), the paper 
shows how the idea gradually crept onto the agenda and into the rhetoric of European foreign policy in 
the years preceding ESDP’s creation.  
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1. Institutional Expansion 
 
A convergence in interests is clearly a pre-requisite for states to engage in policy cooperation. Yet 
while EU member states had apparently long agreed on the need to cooperate in the field of foreign 
policy (as the fact that they had entered into both the EDC and Fouchet negotiations testified), they 
had long diverged in their visions of the institutional form such cooperation should take (Bodenheimer, 
1967). This was largely a manifestation of the long-standing ideological conflict between 
intergovernmental and supranational visions of integration, with the issue of national sovereignty at its 
core (Hoffmann, 2000). In foreign policy this was a particularly sensitive issue, most especially for the 
larger member states whose greater power in the international system and broader range of foreign 
policy options generally rendered them more reluctant to be bound by integration in this field. Hence 
the normative model of integration in the European Community, with its empowerment of 
supranational actors such as the Commission and Court of Justice (ECJ), offered an example of what 
many member states, and in 1970 in particular the French, did not wish to replicate. Therefore when a 
system of cooperation did emerge in 1970, in the form of European Political Cooperation (EPC), its 
structures were markedly distinct from the Community model. As Smith (1998: 307) states: 
 
“it had no permanent budget or staff for many years, no resources of its own, no meeting place, 
no secretariat-general or chief official, and no specific areas of competence. It had no 
compliance procedures, legal obligations, or enforcement mechanisms to speak of, and it 
formally required little more than a commitment (not an obligation) among member states to 
consult with each other and to coordinate their foreign policies if possible.” 
 
Indeed, EPC was intended as a pragmatic, flexible mechanism for foreign policy coordination and 
cooperation among sovereign states that would be as loosely institutionalised and binding as possible. 
Discussions in EPC would be limited to foreign policy, and would avoid security and defence issues 
entirely so as not to undermine cooperation within NATO. It would be wholly separate from the 
Community, and have its own distinct procedures and rules. The European Commission would only be 
“consulted” if its work was “affected by the work of the ministers” in EPC (Luxembourg Report, 1970: 
part two), and since EPC was not part of the EC legal framework the ECJ would have no jurisdiction 
whatsoever. Moreover, all meetings were to be held in the capital of the country holding the 
Presidency, not in Brussels, illustrating that member states – most especially France – wanted to 
“keep the new procedure untainted by the insidious atmosphere of Brussels” (Wallace, 1983:381). On 
one occasion this even went to the extreme of foreign ministers meeting as EPC in Copenhagen in the 
morning and then flying to Brussels to meet as the Council in the afternoon (Nuttall, 1992).  
 
And yet in spite of the clear determination of member states to establish only an informal, loosely 
institutionalised and intergovernmental system of cooperation, EPC slowly became a more formalised, 
more institutionalised and less intergovernmental system which steadily eroded the gap between itself 
and the Community. And this in a system of cooperation based on unanimity and therefore the 
consent of each member state. Indeed, by the time of the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, the 
European Commission had become “fully associated” with EPC and was jointly responsible with the 
Council for ensuring its “consistency” with the Community; discussions had widened in scope to 
include “the economic and political aspects of security”; new institutions, most notably an EPC 
secretariat, had been established; previously informal rules had steadily became semi-formalised as a 
kind of “soft-law” through their codification in successive EPC reports; and a system of policy 
cooperation and coordination had become one of policy-making, with the EU for example using EPC 
to take decisions on imposing economic sanctions on Argentina in the wake of the Falklands / 
Malvinas crisis in 1982 (Smith, 2004).  
 
Despite the lowest-common-denominator structure established by the Luxembourg Report, therefore, 
it appears that member state preferences did not remain fixed regarding the future institutionalised 
form that European foreign policy cooperation might take. Rather it appears that member states 
adjusted their preferences as a result of their interaction with the system they had created, i.e. 
endogenously, rather than exogenously, as rational choice theorists presuppose. Therefore in 
understanding the institutional progression towards a CFSP and ultimately ESDP it is worth asking 
how preferences came to be adjusted in this way. How did, as Smith (1998:310) puts it, “an informal, 
decentralized, non-coercive institution [which] did not enjoy strong public support or interest…[result] 
in an expansion of foreign policy cooperation and changed state interests and preferences”?  
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The most thorough and detailed coverage of the institutionalisation of EPC is offered by Smith (2004). 
He explains how a range of factors led member states to re-evaluate their interests and preferences 
regarding the institutional forms of foreign policy cooperation. These range from the imperative of 
ensuring consistency and the role of policy entrepreneurship of the European Commission to the 
perceived necessity of off-loading the Presidency’s increased workload to a secretariat, even though 
the creation of such an institution had been discussed and rejected in 1970 (Wallace, 1983). 
 
However, the application of learning offers a potentially useful conceptualisation of institutional change 
at this time that builds on the dynamics that Smith highlights. Firstly, learning emphasises pragmatism, 
something which most authors consider to be one of the key’s to EPC’s success (Nuttall, 1992; de 
Schoutheete, 1980; H.Smith, 2002).  The institutional preferences of member states were clearly not 
set in stone, but rather appeared to adapt pragmatically according to experience. As ideologically 
insistent as the belief in intergovernmentalism of some states may have been, they did not, for 
example, block the increased association of the supranational Commission with EPC, even though the 
existence of unanimous voting meant that they would have been able to. It appears therefore that their 
use of the structures in place illustrated the necessity of Commission involvement. Experience and 
new knowledge meant that they came to reinterpret the Commission’s participation as being in their 
collective interest. The realisation among member states that their collective interest in a strong EPC 
able to exert influence in the international environment required increased Commission involvement, 
particularly given both the imperative of ensuring consistency with Community action and the 
Commission’s expertise and global representation, led to an attempt to improve the efficiency of their 
structures by welcoming in the Commission. Had this been already “known” to the Member States we 
would have expected them to have done so as early as 1970. This was therefore an “unanticipated 
consequence”. Certainly this process of learning may have been facilitated by the “bureaucratic 
politics” perspective that the Commission would have itself exploited its own institutional position, to 
both prove the value of its participation on the one hand, and fill the gaps left by member states on the 
other. Certainly its strength within the Community would have helped it achieve both, and it cannot 
have been harmed by the fact that the Community represented a normative model of efficient 
cooperation to the member states. Given that EPC was an innovative and experimental policy field, 
there were few other analogous systems of “best practice” which member states could use as models. 
Looking to the Community for transferable models, despite the supranational implications, may 
therefore have been unavoidable.  
 
We might also take the example of the creation of the EPC secretariat. Again, the preference among 
Member States as expressed in 1970 was that there should no be secretariat (Nuttall, 1992). The 
issue had also been a sticking point during the Fouchet negotiations (Bodenheimer, 1967). However, 
as the competence of EPC extended, the need for some sort of institutional memory became more 
apparent. Firstly, the EPC archive had no permanent home and travelled with the six-month rotating 
Presidency. This naturally proved cumbersome, particularly as it grew in size. Secondly, with 
responsibility for EPC changing every six months there was little way to ensure both continuity across 
presidencies and attention to the precedents set by previous decisions (Smith, 2004). The initial 
response was the creation of the so-called Coutumier, “a compilation of all formal and informal [EPC] 
working procedures” and the Receuil, a collection of all substantive EPC texts produced under each 
presidency (Smith, 2004:124/136). This was later reinforced by the creation of a Troika consisting of 
the previous and subsequent presidencies to ensure continuity. This innovation subsequently paved 
the way for the creation of an EPC Secretariat in the SEA in 1986 (Nuttall, 1992:19-20). Given 
previous incremental developments, the creation of a secretariat no longer appeared as such a big 
jump. This points to the fact that member state institutional preferences appeared to have changed, 
and to the fact that the nature of the system created was itself a catalyst for later reform, i.e. without 
the six-month rotating presidency such a secretariat would not have been needed to overcome the 
lack of continuity (Regelsberger, 1997:73). Thus again, we might well argue that this occurred as a 
result of learning-by-doing. At each stage we appear to see an attempt to improve the efficiency of the 
system in place, first through the consolidation of the texts, later by the bringing together of diplomats 
through the Troika and subsequently through the creation of a permanent secretariat. This shows 
experimentation, a preference for incremental adjustment, and again learning. The “beliefs” of member 
states regarding their institutional preferences appeared to adapt or change according to their 
experience in using the structures they had created and their perceptions of its performance. Hence 
when institutional structures did not produce the efficiency they had hoped for, governmental 
preferences appeared to change. And these preferences slowly moved the system created away from 
the rigid intergovernmentalism that had initially been foreseen.  
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The catalysts for this learning may have been several. Certainly, dysfunctions in the institutional 
structure created may have precipitated change. As shown above, a secretariat eventually became 
necessary because of the nature of the structures established and the increased pressures upon them 
over time. But dysfunctions would in many cases have been rendered particularly apparent only once 
these structures were put to the test, so to speak, particularly in times of crisis. Only then would 
member states “learn” which mechanisms were capable of producing efficient outcomes and which 
were not, and only then would they “learn” to what extent their policy ambitions could be achieved 
through the institutions they had created. A mismatch or imbalance between ambitions and capacities 
may well have driven change. And as Nuttall (1992:4) argues, “the way in which EPC reacted to 
events determined the type of organisation it became” and as Wallace (1983: 378) states, “throughout 
[EPC’s] history, external events have provided much of the impetus.” Certain events were to starkly 
expose such problems. For example, a clear illustration of change occurring in the wake of events was 
the decision in the London Report of 1981 to introduce an emergency crisis procedure in order to be 
able to call meetings within 48 hours. This can be understood as a direct reaction to EPC’s impotence 
during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Wallace, 1983:397). 
 
However, within EPC how did the identification of a problem come to be translated into policy and 
subsequently institutional change? It is one thing to say that institutional dysfunctions were recognised 
by member states, but another to show how member states came to agree on the particular change 
that was to be effectuated in response. What were the mechanisms of change and who were the 
agents of change? And how were perceptions aggregated into change? Further research here is 
required, but certainly a couple of observations might be in order.   
 
Firstly, the importance of the Presidency as a mechanism of learning. Smith (2004:128) observes that 
the observation and attempts at the replication of “successful” presidencies helped to “advance new 
procedural norms of European foreign policy” through a sort of transfer and imitation of best practice. 
This in itself can be considered as a form of learning. But more than this, the fact that assuming the 
EPC Presidency threw a member state into the heart of EPC/CFSP procedures gave them a valuable 
first-hand opportunity to perceive the system’s strengths and weaknesses. Wallace (1983:397) for one 
observes how the British Foreign Office “had been pressing since its first period in the presidency in 
1977 for improvements in procedures”, many of which turned up in the London Report of 1981, while 
Belgium’s over-burdened Presidency of 1977 was the first to borrow a diplomat from the outgoing 
British Presidency as well as later lend one to the incoming Danish presidency (Nuttall, 1992:172). 
This practice appeared to be a response to the difficulties Belgium had faced in assuming the 
Presidency, and later came to be institutionalised as the Troika in the London Report. Presidencies 
also offered member states a chance to put issues on the agenda, and therefore to directly propose 
institutional reform.  
 
As also illustrated above, learning appears to be in many cases precipitated by events. Events trigger 
change “by underscoring the costs of existing institutions and emphasising the potential benefits of 
alternative institutional arrangements” (Cortell and Peterson, 2002:8). Particular geopolitical events 
appeared to make actors question their own institutional preferences by exposing the weaknesses or 
problems with existing structures. Such events might therefore be understood as catalysts that 
provided an impetus for change. However, with first six and later nine or more member states 
implicated in the system, each holding a potential veto, it is important to ask how the perception of the 
need for change translates or is aggregated into actual change. Within the EU this is clearly 
complicated, but again we would expect the Presidency to hold a key role, given its agenda-setting 
powers, although unanimity might be expected to cause lowest-common-denominator or sub-optimal 
reform. And yet Smith and Nuttall both highlight that the approach of policymakers within EPC, 
particularly at the sub-systemic levels where most business was conducted (the Political Committee 
and Working Groups, for example), was more of a “problem-solving” one rather than a bargaining one. 
They highlight the mutual interest all sides had in developing trust, reciprocity, in being constructive, 
and in improving the structures they had put in place since a strengthened EU foreign policy was 
considered beneficial for all concerned. Again, this appears to contradict a simple rational-choice 
account.  
 
 
2. Functional Expansion 
 
So this illustrates elements of EPC’s institutional expansion. However, it is also important to note its 
functional expansion (Smith, 2004: 52-3). EPC began by discussing issues of foreign policy only. With 
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the Cold War still at its height, security and defence issues were kept squarely in NATO. There was 
therefore something of a hierarchical division of labour. Although it was the British and Dutch who 
were particularly insistent on this, it was clear that any perceived threat to NATO’s hegemony would 
have been counterproductive to say the least. Moreover the neutrality of Ireland and the general 
hostility of Denmark also proved to be brakes on any vaulting ambition. However, it would be wrong to 
assume that EPC’s institutional deepening was in no way matched by a widening of its agenda. 
Certainly as member states grew in confidence the range of subjects that they discussed and took 
positions upon through EPC steadily increased. And slowly but surely, despite the constraints of the 
Cold War, the taboo of widening EPC’s scope towards security and defence questions began to be 
weakened, again incrementally, to the point that by the time the Treaty on European Union was signed 
in 1991, “virtually no subject was off limits” (Smith, 2004:144).  
 
Again, an initial reluctance appeared to be challenged by the pragmatic perception of reality. In 
discussing many issues of global politics, for example, in reality it proved rather difficult to avoid 
security and defence questions: in discussing crises in the Middle East or progress in the CSCE 
touching on broader security issues could hardly be avoided (Nuttall, 1992; Smith, 2004). So it was 
that whereas the Copenhagen Report of 1973 had stated that “governments will consult on all 
important foreign policy questions”, by the London Report of 1981 this had been extended to “foreign 
policy questions bearing on the political aspects of security”. By the time of the Solemn Declaration of 
Stuttgart in 1983 this had been extended to include “all major foreign policy questions of 
interest…[and] the political and economic aspects of security”. That some sort of rubicon had been 
crossed appeared to be confirmed by the decision in October 1984 to reactivate the Western 
European Union (WEU) as a kind of ready-made defence institution that would henceforth be put at 
the EU’s disposal. In their statement, WEU members announced that the “better utilization of WEU 
would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the 
common defence of all countries of the Atlantic Alliance” (WEU, 1984). The idea was that those EU 
member states that were also members of the WEU could “outsource” the discussion of security and 
more particularly defence issues to a ready-made, external institution through twice-yearly ministerial 
meetings. This avoided the difficult issue of Irish neutrality and also did not pose difficulties for 
Denmark or Greece since they were not WEU members. Neither did it directly threaten NATO, nor 
broach the long problematic issue of a common European defence policy within the EU. But clearly 
the genie was out of the bottle. 
 
The Single European Act (SEA), which for the first time collated EPC rules and procedures into a 
legally-binding treaty, also made some rhetorical progress on the question of tackling security. It 
stated that member states “consider that closer cooperation on questions of European security would 
contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters. 
They are ready to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of 
security.” (SEA, Title III, 6). As in all previous reports, however, it was reaffirmed that “nothing in this 
title shall impede closer cooperation in the field of security between certain of the High Contracting 
Parties within the framework of the Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance.” As they had and 
would continue to be, therefore, the consideration of the other European security institutions and 
commitments were seen to be imperative and hence the EU’s institutional trajectory can also be 
understood to have been heavily impacted upon by the existence of such external institutions.  
 
Yet as shown, even during the confines of the Cold War, member states were making no secret of 
their longer-term ambitions. Indeed, a WEU ministerial statement issued at The Hague in October 
1987 stated that its members were “convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will 
remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.” (WEU, 1987). It should come 
as no surprise, therefore, that with the end of the Cold War came increased pressure to achieve this 
very outcome. This point shall be examined further below.  
 
So this then can be understood as one dynamic towards a security and defence policy in the 
European Union: the existence since 1970 of foreign policy cooperation among EU member states, 
and the slow but steady deepening of its structures and degree of institutionalisations on the one 
hand, and the widening of its policy scope to include security and even defence issues on the other. 
These tendencies continued to maintain momentum over time. The point therefore is that if we see 
foreign policy cooperation at one end of a continuum, and a common EU defence policy at the other, 
then the history of EPC shows us an incremental progression from one towards (if not yet reaching) 
the other. Progression along this continuum was achieved by taking a pragmatic, problem-solving 
approach to institutional reform. Dogmatic intergovernmentalism, which appeared to define the initial 
approach of some member states to cooperation, gave way to a more flexible, pragmatic approach in 
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which institutional preferences changed and member states attempted to improve their efficiency 
through learning. Such learning was often driven by external events and the weaknesses or problems 
that they exposed. This progression does not, however, lead directly to the creation of the ESDP. At 
some point such progression along the continuum would eventually meet a wall. And this wall was 
arguably first the Cold War and the imperatives of Alliance cohesion, and secondly a British veto. The 
ending of the Cold War in 1991 naturally removed the first obstacle, but the second proved more 
enduring, only being lifted much later as we shall go on to see. But it is important to note the hurdle 
that had been overcome: that of discussing security issues and the admission of the aspiration 
towards a defence role. Paul Pierson (2004:217) quotes Thomasina in Tom Stoppard’s play Arcadia 
who asks “why can you stir jam into pudding, but you cannot stir it out?” The point is that once security 
and defence questions had been stirred into EPC, they too could not be stirred out. The same could 
be said of many other developments in EPC, including the “full association” of the European 
Commission and the creation of EPC secretariat. They developed a “taken for granted” quality and 
constituted a sort of “deep equilibrium” that came to be accepted and unquestioned (Pierson, 
2004:220). Yet further dynamics were required to move this system towards an ESDP.  
 
 
III. EXTERNAL FACTORS AS DYNAMICS TOWARDS AN ESDP 
 
Above we have seen how the institutional and functional expansion of EPC gave rise to a context in 
which the development of an ESDP became more logical and perhaps even necessary. This next 
section aims to show how what might be termed “external” factors, in the sense of external institutions, 
external actors and external events, pushed towards and influenced the development of the ESDP. 
The point is that once progression within EPC had hit the geopolitical wall of the Cold War, it required 
major changes in the international environment, in particular the end of the Cold War and the flux that 
this created in inter-institutional relationships across Europe, to create something of a “critical juncture” 
which on the one hand created greater pressure and indeed support for further European defence 
autonomy and on the other created an environment in which such a development became both 
conceivable and possible. Although we might ultimately point the finger at Blair’s policy u-turn in 1998 
and the tangible, qualitative leap that this resulted in, developments since the end of the Cold War 
created pressures in this direction, with previous movement within the EU facilitating such an 
eventuality. These factors combined in a “window of opportunity” during which time the costs of 
mobilising support for such a policy change were reduced and the benefits more apparent. Hence 
again we might see learning as a central factor, with the agents of policy change revising their 
strategies based on new information or perceptions of events. 
 
 
1. The End of the Cold War: Geopolitical Change and Institutional Competition  
 
A starting point is therefore the end of the Cold War and the removal of what had been perceived as a 
key obstacle to European security and defence autonomy. The subsequent change in NATO’s role 
and position led to a reappraisal of that of the EU: with the Soviet threat gone, and with it the Alliance’s 
very raison d’être, suddenly the EU appeared well placed to assume a more central position in 
European security. This was because, firstly, proposals for European defence could no longer be 
automatically held hostage to the geostrategic imperatives of the Cold War. And secondly, as a de 
fault multidimensional actor and “civilian power”, the EU appeared as the very embodiment of the 
post-Cold War international actor. These two factors might appear contradictory: that history had 
suddenly removed an obstacle to the EU becoming a military power, whereas on the other hand its 
new position in the international system was based largely on the fact that, in the post-NATO and 
Warsaw Pact era, the EU was not an “old-fashioned” military alliance. Indeed, such an issue remains 
a key dispute: does the acquisition of military power render obsolete the notion of “civilian power”? 
(Stavridis, 2001).  
But despite the potential for such a “critical juncture” to effectuate significant institutional change, such 
change certainly did not occur immediately. NATO did not disappear, as Realist scholars suggested, 
and the EU did not suddenly acquire a defence policy. This might be explained by a number of factors. 
For example, we might suggest that even if a “window of opportunity” is opened, actors can still be 
constrained in their ability to actually bring about change, particularly because of the restrictions of 
existing institutional arrangements (Cortell and Peterson, 2002). Hence in a unanimous decision-
making system, the veto of one actor is sufficient to scupper change. Thus in the case of moves 
towards an ESDP, the British veto at Maastricht might be one important factor. This in itself appeared 
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motivated by the fact that NATO’s very success was considered by some to be a reason for it not to 
be jettisoned. Margaret Thatcher argued at the time that “you don’t cancel your insurance policy just 
because there have been less burglaries on your street recently.” (quoted in Evans, 1998). This might 
illustrate that learning is essentially an “analytic construction” (Levy, 1994) since a person’s own belief 
system and world view will invariably lead them to perceive different lessons to another, even from the 
same event.  
Thatcher’s comment, however, was certainly representative of the British desire to maintain American 
engagement in Europe. And the US “factor” remained and does remain an important consideration in 
all related initiatives, and not solely for the UK: worries about US disengagement, particularly as a 
result of its search for a peace dividend in the wake of the Cold War and what this might mean for 
NATO, were widespread. Europe’s general lack of modern military capabilities as well as command 
and control structures outside of NATO meant that any weakening of the Alliance without any 
commensurate strengthening of other European structures was certainly not an attractive option. In 
the immediate post-Cold War period, therefore, there was in fact little option other than NATO, 
although the EU was well-placed to begin to exploit the new ambiguities in NATO’s responsibilities 
and authority to its own advantage. Yet for some a greater European drive on capabilities and 
structures was also seen as a necessary reinforcing and rebalancing of the Alliance, and by 
implication a way of dissuading US disengagement rather than inciting it. The Maastricht Treaty was 
symbolic of greater ambitions, as shown below, but it would require further events and further learning 
until such an idea became more widespread.   
Much has been written on the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at 
Maastricht and the extent to which it represented or not a qualitative improvement on the previous 
system of EPC (e.g. Forster and Wallace, 1996, 2000, Winn and Lord, 2001). It is not necessary 
therefore to go over this here. However, for our analysis at least two changes are of significance. 
Firstly, with the confines of the Cold War gone, the Maastricht Treaty for the first time in an EU 
document articulated the Union’s interest in pursuing a common defence. Article J.4.1 stated that 
“[t]he common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the 
Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a 
common defence.” Thus even as early as 1991 the intellectual seeds of the ESDP were being sown, 
and the ambitions to such being articulated.  
Secondly, the CFSP provided for action rather than mere coordination or consultation. Not only did it 
create “new” policy instruments in the form of “Joint Actions” and “Common Positions” but it also 
stated that the WEU would henceforth be called upon “to elaborate and implement decisions and 
actions of the Union which have defence implications” as the defence arm of the Union, but again in a 
way that “shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain 
Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the  North Atlantic 
Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that 
framework.” (Art J.4, TEU). Thus the WEU remained the favoured institutional option for an EU 
defence policy, as opposed to the establishment of such institutions within the EU itself. This might 
have been because of the same points that made the WEU the preferred solution in 1984. We might 
also hypothesise that this was so because of the costs of institutional creation: in a world of scarce 
resources, adapting existing institutions to accommodate new tasks may often in the first instance be 
preferable to building new institutions from scratch (Aggarwal, 1998:24) But we must also remember 
that NATO considerations remained of primary importance, and even if the EU can be understood to 
have been exploiting a “window of opportunity” to effectuate institutional change, there was a 
prevailing awareness that this must be achieved in compatibility with NATO.   
Thus geopolitical change introduced an element of competition into the European security 
architecture. It was a fundamental irony that NATO’s ultimate success in the Cold War was now the 
very reason that its existence was challenged. Whereas NATO had previously reigned supreme, it 
was now having to contend with increasing European ambitions on the one hand and calls from 
Russia for a reinforced role for the OSCE on the other. As theories of bureaucratic politics and 
institutionalism would have predicted, NATO reacted in an attempt to redefine its role and demonstrate 
its continued relevance. Accordingly, the Alliance launched its “Partnership for Peace” outreach 
programme in 1994 and more significantly for our analysis the Common Joint Task Force (CJTF) 
initiative, arguably “the key internal military innovation undertaken by NATO” (Terriff, 2003:39). Put 
briefly, the intention was to allow particular NATO assets and command structures to be used on a 
case-by-case basis for operations led by the WEU, and therefore without the necessity of US 
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leadership (NATO, 1999). From one perspective this was an example of an institution adapting to 
changed circumstances, attempting to render its forces more deployable and more flexible. However, 
it could also be seen as a direct reaction to developments within the EU: if the WEU could use NATO 
command structures and assets, so the logic might have gone, then there would be less need for EU 
member states to develop their own outside of NATO. NATO might therefore scupper moves towards 
greater European defence autonomy by providing that very autonomy itself.  
Yet from a European perspective, CJTF might have been perceived rather differently. For one thing, 
the offer of NATO forces and command structures to a nascent European Security and Defence 
Identity (ESDI) appeared to be a much-needed American endorsement of the idea and therefore offer 
something of a political green-light. Given sensitivities towards the American reaction to moves in this 
direction, this point should not be understated. And in giving such a green light, it also precipitated 
France’s reintegration into several of NATO’s command structures, something that also in itself led 
towards a stronger European pillar within the Alliance and in fact to bringing France closer to the 
British position (Forster and Wallace, 2000). Equally, in a sense we might also see it as representing a 
degree of “forum-shopping” for the Europeans, allowing EU member states to experiment with 
different institutional possibilities beyond the EU before deciding to seek a solution from within. 
Certainly what CJTF did not offer was European autonomy, however. The release of structures and 
assets would have to be approved unanimously by the North Atlantic Council and therefore offered 
non-EU members a veto over EU-only missions (Terriff, 2003). 
 
 
2. War in the Former Yugoslavia: Learning the Institutional Lessons 
This strand leads us to the late 1990s and the resuscitation of the ESDP debate. However, 
developments within the EU also continued apace. Almost as soon as the ink had dried on the 
Maastricht Treaty, civil war broke out in the former Yugoslavia and the new procedures were quickly 
thrown into hot water. And whereas expectations of the EU were high, both from external actors such 
as the US which was keen to see the EU assume more responsibility for ensuring security in its 
neighbourhood, and from EU member states themselves, their capabilities actually remained limited. 
In one famous comment, Jacques Poos, then Luxembourg’s foreign minister, declared that “this is the 
hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans” as he walked into broker a cease-fire between the 
warring parties (quoted in Peterson and Bomberg, 1999:242). That ceasefire quickly broke down and 
fighting soon reintensified. This was the perfect illustration of what Christopher Hill (1993) has 
famously termed “the capability-expectations gap”, with the expectations of what the EU should be 
capable of far out-stripping what it was actually capable of. This again can be considered a dynamic of 
change. 
The Maastricht Treaty had recognised that the new provisions should be subject to revision in 1996. 
There was, therefore, an in-built mechanism for learning: only once member states had worked with 
the structures in place would they be able to determine their success. Few, however, had counted on 
the CFSP being thrown so quickly and dramatically into assuming responsibility for resolving such a 
conflict. But the institutional changes that were to come in the Amsterdam Treaty appeared in many 
cases to be a clear reaction to the “environmental triggers” of the EU’s failings in the Balkans, and 
thus represented an attempt to at once learn from and improve upon previous institutional “errors”. 
Thus agreement was finally reached on reforms that had long been on the table, supporting the thesis 
emphasising the importance of external events as a driving force for institutional change.  
Firstly, and perhaps most significantly, a French proposal to create a High Representative for the 
CFSP was agreed upon (Forster and Wallace, 2000:482). Although the precise reasons for its 
proposal and subsequent adoption are explored in detail elsewhere (e.g. Peterson, 1998), certainly 
the problems of continuity and confusion caused by the rotating Presidency and the multi-cephalous 
external representation of the Troika proved particularly problematic in the Balkans. Moreover, 
member states even agreed to the appointment of a high profile figure to the position, Javier Solana. 
The appointment of a former NATO Secretary-General was symbolic of the inter-relationship and inter-
dependence between the two organisations and also perhaps an acknowledgement of the need for a 
mutual understanding. Indeed, Solana’s successor was the former British defence secretary, George 
Robertson, who had himself been a driving force behind the creation of the ESDP. 
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Further changes at Amsterdam included the creation of a “Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit 
(PPEWU) whose responsibilities included “monitoring and analysing developments in areas relevant 
to the CFSP” as well as “providing timely assessments and early warning of events or situations which 
may have significant repercussions for the Union's foreign and security policy, including potential 
political crises”.  Its creation can therefore be interpreted as a response to criticism that the CFSP was 
far too reactive in nature, only responding to events once they had happened rather than anticipating 
them. In providing a forward-planning capability, again it would give the EU “what it sorely lacked in 
the post-Maastricht period (particularly as regards the former Yugoslavia[)]” (Peterson and Bomberg, 
1999:231). Other innovations also appeared to be representative of a problem-solving approach: the 
introduction of a “constructive abstention” procedure seemed motivated by the need to avoid the 
potential paralysis of the CFSP should the newly acceded “neutrals” of Austria, Finland and Sweden 
wish to opt-out of certain actions without exercising a veto over them. From the point of view of a 
common defence, the principal change was only in wording. With Blair having vetoed the integration of 
the WEU into the EU (although other states, particularly the neutrals along with Portugal, were also 
reluctant) all that could be agreed was that the CFSP “shall include all questions relating to the 
security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy…which might in 
time lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide.” (Article 17, TEU).  The 
Treaty did, however, leave the possibility of integrating the WEU into the EU open.  
These changes are important to our analysis because they again illustrate the collective will to 
strengthen existing structures, particular in the light of their previous performance, and to thereby 
move further towards a system that could be said to be increasingly “Brusselised” (Allen, 1998) and if 
not supranationalised then certainly less intergovernmental. Thus, what we saw was a confluence of 
two essentially complementary strands: on the one hand, the gradual strengthening of EU foreign and 
security policy structures, including the long-term aspiration to a defence role, and on the other the 
end of the Cold War, worries about US disengagement and a potential weakening of Europe’s only 
extra-national capacity to take military action, NATO.  This combined with events in Bosnia and 
subsequently Kosovo, with the US in both cases initially reluctant to get involved, and the awareness 
on behalf of the Europeans that they were wholly dependent upon the US to back up their diplomacy 
with the threat and the actual use of military force. The combination of these developments appear to 
have produced a “window of opportunity” during which time moves towards greater European 
autonomy appeared more necessary and possible than at any time previously.  
 
 
IV. THE BLAIR U-TURN 
 
Despite the confluence of the above factors, this is of course not to state that this development was 
inevitable. Indeed, history could always have been different: simply because a historical event 
occurred does not mean that it necessarily had to (Schulin, 2004). What is more, even if various 
political leaders were thinking along similar lines, they did not invariably all reach the same conclusion. 
France for a long-time had pushed the WEU as the most appropriate forum for future European 
defence autonomy, for example. And yet by the end of the 1990s “the WEU had seemingly outlived its 
usefulness” (Latawski and Smith, 2003:130) with member states proving reluctant to either upgrade its 
operational capabilities or to use it in times of crisis. The expiration of its original Treaty in 1998 
therefore seemed rather symbolic. But the NATO option had also essentially been tried and tested and 
rejected. Indeed, even as early as the Alliance’s Berlin Summit in 1996 the idea that CJTF could 
function as an alternative to greater European security and defence autonomy had essentially been 
scuppered. Against this backdrop, therefore, the idea of equipping the EU with its own capability 
therefore appeared more attractive than ever. Yet even despite the confluence of these contextual 
streams, and the strength and importance of institutional factors in bringing political leaders so far, we 
must not deny the importance of agency: ultimately it was Blair’s role as a “trigger” that made the 
ESDP possible. Whether a Conservative election victory in 1997 would have resulted in the same 
support for an ESDP will invariably remain an open question. Certainly that party’s rhetoric has 
remained against, its 1997 election manifesto stating that “NATO will remain the cornerstone of our 
security. We will resist attempts to bring the Western European Union under the control of the 
European Union, and ensure that defence policy remains a matter for sovereign nations” 
(Conservative Party, 1997) and again in 2001 under a changed leadership reaffirming that 
“Conservatives have always supported stronger European defence co-operation, but always inside 
NATO. We will not participate in a structure outside NATO, but will insist instead that any European 
initiative is under the NATO umbrella.” (Conservative Party, 2001). 
 
Working Paper 63 
Observatori de Política Exterior Europea 
 
 13
Then British Foreign Minister Malcolm Rifkind is even reported to have toured European capitals just 
before the 1997 election campaigning rigorously against such a European initiative, which Howorth 
(2004) attributes to Rifkind’s party leadership ambitions. Yet that he could apparently gain standing in 
his party by espousing such rhetoric signalled the strength of anti-European feeling within his party 
and the unlikelihood that such moves would have found support there. Yet equally for the present 
analysis it is interesting because it represents an acknowledgement that there was “something in the 
air” regarding the idea of European defence.  
 
However, we must also remember that Blair’s initial instinct, despite his more pro-European 
credentials, was to maintain the outgoing government’s position on the issue and indeed he vetoed 
the integration of the WEU into the EU at Amsterdam (Whitman, 1999). He commented at the time 
that: “getting Europe’s voice heard more clearly in the world will not be achieved through merging the 
European Union and the Western European Union or developing an unrealistic common defence 
policy. We therefore resisted unacceptable proposals from others.” (quoted in Latawski and Smith, 
2003: 128). Even as late as May 1998, the British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook stated that: “we do 
not see the European Union becoming a defence organisation… we will be working for better 
cooperation between the EU and the WEU but not for merger between them” (Latawski and Smith, 
2003: 128).  
Hence in the case of the Blair government we have to account for a policy reversal in the space of 
only several months. Whereas in mid-1998 the government apparently stood firmly against European 
defence autonomy, by October 1998 in Pörtschach, Austria, Blair was speculating openly on the 
desirability of a NATO-compatible defence role for the EU (See Rutten, 2001) while by that December 
he was standing alongside President Chirac and Prime Minister Jospin at St Malo suggesting that the 
EU “must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means 
to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (see 
Rutten, 2001). 
 As shown above, this policy change cannot be accounted for by the simple notion of electoral 
“turnover”. Had this been the case we would have expected the change in the British position to have 
come sooner, perhaps at Amsterdam. Moreover there was no indication prior to Blair’s election victory 
that Labour had been considering any move in this direction: the party’s 1997 manifesto simply stated 
that, “a new Labour government will build a strong defence against [post-Cold War] threats. Our 
security will continue to be based on NATO.” (Labour Party, 1997) This in itself is of course not 
concrete proof that Blair did not have ambitions in the field of European defence: the party manifesto 
also made no mention of its wish to make the Bank of England independent, even though this was 
announced on 6th May 1997, only four days after he assumed office. But its actions and discourse at 
Amsterdam would appear to reinforce the view that the Blair government underwent a change of 
thinking on European defence in a relatively short space of time.  
 
Again, the theory of learning might well be fruitfully applied to understanding how and why. We have 
seen how contextual events made such a policy change more plausible, more possible, and in a 
sense also more necessary. However, it remains of interest to ask how this change was effectuated. 
And equally, what caused “the British decision to end a fifty-year veto on European defence 
integration” (Howorth, 2000: 29) at this particular time? Certainly, theories of experiential learning 
emphasise the importance of experience in leading to change. Political actors will adjust their beliefs 
on the basis of their personal experience, or even on their interpretation of the experience of others. 
The interpretation of experience however is subjective, and is considered to be affected by new 
information, ideas, and by offered expertise, potentially through the kind of “bottom-up” learning that 
was highlighted earlier. Hence if we focus on the role of Blair as Prime Minister in opening up the 
British position on European defence, we might ask to what extent Blair was being offered advice, 
ideas and information in this vain and perhaps more importantly from whom.   
 
In Blair’s case, that Britain should consider moving ahead with European defence autonomy had been 
suggested independently by two close advisors to the Prime Minister within a relatively short space of 
time. Robert Cooper, a senior FCO official and trusted advisor of the Prime Minister, was charged by 
Blair in the summer of 1998 with drafting a policy paper on the future of Europe. As part of a wider 
rethink of British EU policy it proposed “a European capacity to act independently in the defence field” 
(The Economist, October 8th, 1998). This position was reinforced by a policy paper published in 
October 1998 by Charles Grant of the London-based Centre for European Reform, a think-tank close 
to New Labour, which concluded that “post-Amsterdam…Europe’s security architecture remains an 
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unsatisfactory mess” and subsequently proposed the abolition of the WEU and the merger of its 
political functions into the EU via a fourth pillar (Grant, 1998). This, interestingly, was an idea said to 
have already been considered by the Major government in 1994 (Whitman, 1999). Yet despite 
admitting that such an idea had “been mooted in the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence” Grant 
accepted that “[t]hese ideas are far from being adopted as British policy” (Grant, 1998: 45-47).  
 
New ideas are one thing, of course. But learning theories suggest that information received must 
generally conform to pre-existing ideas, and that recommendations not confirming to pre-existing 
ideas will often be rejected: essentially, such advice will only accelerate change if it falls on fertile 
ground or if the political actor’s beliefs are not deeply entrenched. While William Wallace (1983) 
pointed out that the Council Presidency led the British to push for reform of EPC in the late 1970s, so 
might Blair’s holding of the Council Presidency in the first half of 1998 also have impacted upon his 
thinking. From the view of experiential learning, his increased awareness and first-hand experience of 
using EU structures, particularly for our study in foreign policy and against the backdrop of the Kosovo 
crisis, may well have served to move Blair away from his previous apparent antipathy to defence 
cooperation outside of NATO to one where such an eventuality seemed more desirable. For example, 
when briefed in the spring of 1998 on the state of European capabilities should military action need to 
be taken in Kosovo, particularly should the Americans choose to not get involved, Blair was said to be 
“appalled”. As Philip Gordon (2000) explains, “[t]he endless, complex series of meetings, committees, 
and untested arrangements that such a scenario would entail made the idea of a solo operation seem 
fantastic.” The situation was that one institution, the EU, would by unanimity delegate another 
institution, the WEU, to take defence decisions on its behalf which, in the wake of the CJTF initiative, 
would then be executed by a third institution, NATO, which itself also operated by unanimity. As 
George Robertson was to comment in early 1999, “[t]here are plenty of ways to design and redesign 
the security architecture of Europe. There are wiring diagrams by the thousand, but a wiring diagram 
cannot be sent to a crisis.” (Hansard, 22 March 1999) 
 
These observations and experiences may have led Blair to recalculate the costs of the existing 
structures in comparison with the benefits of change and the rationalisation of existing sructures. With 
the NATO option exhausted and in any case not offering true autonomy and the WEU widely 
perceived to have been a failure given that it had been so often over-looked by its member states, the 
EU’s time seemed to have come.  Yet it is not even necessary for us to go so far as to say that Blair’s 
fundamental interest or even preference changed, even if it could be argued that this was the case. At 
a minimum we could say that the process of learning led to a change of strategy: fundamentally Blair 
maintained the unwaivering atlanticism and belief in transatlantic relations of the previous 
administration, but can be understood to have altered his strategy of how best to achieve and maintain 
this (Howorth, 2000). He moved from an extension of the previous government’s position that 
European defence would weaken the Alliance to the perception that such an eventuality was finally 
necessary and could in fact complement it and even strengthen it. Indeed, the EU’s incapacity to act 
illustrated the importance of such a reform to strengthen the Union itself. This reversal occurred in a 
very short space of time. And in so doing Blair would also be able to exploit Britain’s leadership role in 
this field, thereby both concretely illustrating his desire to lead in Europe and enabling him to have a 
determining impact upon the nature of subsequent structures and developments (Jopp, 1999). Blair 
had a strong hand to play: in unblocking the British position he was able to call the shots and ensure 
that events moved on his terms. As for the French, they were simply glad that there was movement in 
the British position. 
 
A Franco-British Summit was an obvious place to make the leap, given that rapprochement between 
these two members of the dominant actor coalition in this policy field would inevitably lie at the heart of 
any defence initiative. Blair had already offered earlier soundings at Pörtschach, but it was by the 
autumn of 1998 that his “conversion” appeared to have become more concrete. This corresponded, as 
mentioned above, to the advice he was getting. Moreover, the following Council Presidencies would 
be those of Germany, Finland and Portugal. Each could be expected to be constructive and, in the 
case of Germany and Portugal, Atlanticist in its perspective on European defence. Had a French or 
Belgian Council Presidency immediately followed, for example, might Blair have been more reluctant? 
Such a consideration might also help us account for Blair’s perception of a “window of opportunity”.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has attempted to introduce the application of historical institutionalist and learning 
perspectives to the study of the development of the European Security and Defence Policy. It has 
illustrated that in gaining an understanding of institutional dynamics in this policy field over time we 
can see moves towards the ESDP as occurring along something of a continuum. A more temporally 
restricted analysis would miss many of these factors. Indeed, although the election of the Blair 
government in 1997 was undoubtedly one of the keys that unlocked the ESDP, this development 
needs to be placed in a much broader context and would have been unlikely to have had the same 
impact were it not for a range of other factors.  
 
Certainly, as has been shown, the idea of European defence is by no means new, and such rhetoric 
has long accompanied the integration project. Although we might not exactly term it “spill-over”, the 
perception of success of EPC/CFSP and the will of member states to both deepen it institutionally and 
widen it functionally was an essential foundation to the ESDP. Yet the possibility of moving forward 
was unblocked only by the end of the Cold War, and the tentative use of the WEU for military 
operations in the early part of the 1990s was illustrative of an EU looking to find its feet in this area. 
Once member states had experienced the weakness and indeed complexity of WEU structures and 
membership, however, then another solution needed to be found. Despite attempts to harness NATO 
in this regard, its inflexibility and the ultimate reliance on US leadership led to its rejection. Hence we 
see an element of “forum shopping”, with ESDP therefore coming to represent something of a 
“winning formula”. 
 
The move towards the EU “option” was facilitated by geopolitical events. They illustrated that existing 
EU structures and capabilities were inadequate for the role to which the EU aspired in the changed 
security environment of post-Cold War Europe. Equally, Europe was seeing a US increasingly 
reluctant to be the both the continued paymaster of European security and to take a leadership role in 
intervening in crises when it considered its vital interests to not be at stake. These strands combined 
and were assisted by a softening of French attitudes towards NATO and by its reintegration into some 
command structures, as well as by a more pragmatic conception of neutrality among the EU’s neutral 
member states.  
 
Some of the suggestions in this paper certainly need to be supported through further empirical 
research. However, the intention has been to show that institutionalist and learning theories can offer 
useful insights into understanding political and institutional developments in this policy field. Both 
approaches might also offer fruitful lines of inquiry into accounting for the actual institutional structures 
created to govern the ESDP, with our previous analysis suggesting that we might well find examples 
of path dependency on the on hand, and institutional transfer on the other.  
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